The transformation of the state in western Europe provides new opportunities for expression for minority nations. Spain has a long history as a multinational state and, in the twentieth century, this has been one of the principal sources of political conflict.
below by forms of economic restructuring rooted in local and regional specificities. The three-directional erosion of the nation-state from above, from below, and laterally in the face of the market, has broken the link between economic change and policy making and between policy making and representation. It has undermined social solidarity and made difficult the old class compromises and trade-offs which underpinned the west European welfare settlement of the postwar era. It has weakened the capacity of states to manage their spatial economies. It has even threatened economic efficiency, by militating against the production of public goods and the social cooperation which is the essential counterpart to competition in a market economy.
At the same time, a new continental regime is being built in Europe, providing a new economic and political space and framework for identities. This European political space is, compared with the nation-state, rather disorganized and complex. Some observers stress the constitution of the EU, analagous to other international organizations in which states play the dominant role. Others point to the possibilities for non-state actors to operate with a certain degree of autonomy, perhaps by-passing the state altogether and certainly operating at the margin of the state system. There has developed a considerable literature on regions and their ability to operate within Europe. 7 Europe in particular provides a new context for national minorities and the management of nationality issues. It diffuses sovereignty by creating a new layer of political authority and, however much some state leaders might deny it, irreparably damages the doctrine of absolute sovereignty. This creates an opening for those challenging sovereignty from below and brings in a new set of concepts and a new political vocabulary. Europe also encourages the growth of multiple identities among both citizens and political leaders, a 4 4 principle which can also be extended downwards. It provides a new political space, organized in a complex and asymmetrical manner, in which a variety of state and nonstate actors operate, seek expression and exert influence. Of course, the European Union continues to be dominated by states, who are represented in the Council, where final decisions are taken, but there remains a large sphere of politics around it, in which multiple influences can be brought to bear. Beyond the EU, the Council of Europe provides another political arena in which national minorities can find an audience; and through the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights divorces the idea of universal human rates from the nation-state. In these circumstances, nationalism ceases to be a zero-sum game in which any gain by national minorities represents an equivalent loss of authority by the state and in which only one national identity can prevail over one territory. Specifically, Europe provides two things for national minorities. The first is a series of opportunities to influence policy, using the multiple channels of influence available. The second, perhaps more important, is that it creates a new symbolic realm, a discursive space in which minority nationality claims can be advanced without necessarily entering into terminal conflict with the host state.
So we are in a world where multiple spheres of authority coexist with multiple systems of action. It would be a serious error to present this as totally new, or to contrast it with a mythical state of the classical era which was able to monopolize authority and internalize the policy process. These tendencies have always been present, but have been greatly magnified in the contemporary era and affect most seriously those states which in the past have sought to centralize and monopolize authority. In another sense, these trends 5 5 represent a step back in history, to an era of overlapping authority, multiple identity and complexity, before the rise of the modern state.
These trends affect different states in different ways. Some, like Germany and France, have proved resilient. In others, where there are pre-existing cultural fault-lines, or where the state has historically been ineffective in achieving national integration, there are renewed centrifugal tendencies, as competing conceptions of the nation and collective identity are revived as alternative ways of confronting the challenge of globalization and the disintegrative effects of the international market. Notable cases are Canada, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain. Here we find renewed minority nationalisms, seeking to use the new global order and, in particular, continental regimes like the European Union and NAFTA, as a framework for new forms of autonomy.
Spain, the nation and Europe
The Spanish state has historically been conspicuously unsuccessful in building a unitary nation. The first Spanish state was a federation of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, themselves internally differentiated. Aragon was a confederation, in which Catalonia enjoyed a large measure of self-rule. In the kingdom of Castile, the historic fueros, notably in the Basque provinces, restricted arbitrary central power. Soon after unification, Spain was diverted into imperial ventures, and under Charles V was linked to the Holy Roman Empire. This was therefore a diverse and sprawling polity, with multiple centres of authority and overlapping spheres of sovereignty. The minority nations, in Catalonia, the Basque provinces and Galicia, were as inclined to look outward as inward. Catalonia thrived in the middle ages and early modern period as a Mediterranean trading nation. 
Catalonia and Europe
Catalan nationalism has, since the early part of the twentieth century, presented itself as modernizing and European. Europe was seen as a symbol of modernity, an important counterpoint to the reactionary forces in Madrid. Yet at the same time, the Catalan bourgeoisie who led the first 'regionalist' and then nationalist movements were fiercely protectionist since, while Catalan industry was the most competitive in Spain, it could not compete with British, German and northern Italian products. So Catalan industrialists, while pressing for home rule, needed the Spanish state to deliver tariff protection and a captive market -they also needed to call on the forces of the state to keep their own revolutionary proletariat in order. Politically, too, they looked both ways, alternating between seeking local autonomy and gaining power within the state with a view to 'catalanizing' Spain. The bourgeois nationalist movement's failure to resolve these contradictions was an important element in its decline from the 1920s. Thereafter European. Catalans in the majority continue to feel both Spanish and Catalan but the European identity is ever more salient and, among native Catalans, is now equal to Spanish identity. 12 Convergència i Unió is in favour of the most advanced programme for European integration, including the single currency and common foreign and security policies, but accompanies this with demands for the strict application of subsidiarity and a guaranteed role for regional interests. 13 The present constitution of the European Union falls considerably short of CiU's demands, but they have been very active making the most of existing opportunities. 
The Basque Country in Europe
The origins of Basque nationalism are very different from those of its Catalan counterpart 14 and while there has been considerable convergence over recent decades, significant differences in attitudes and assumptions remain. Early Basque nationalism was rooted in local particularism and insularity, with a racist element rejecting outsiders of all sorts but especially Spaniards (among whom were included Catalans). It was antiindustrial and politically conservative, if not reactionary. While these features were modified considerably in the early twentieth century with the accession of a section of the Basque bourgeoisie, the element of particularism has remained. Basque industrialization really took off only when the prohibition on the export of iron ore brought in capital to Vizcaya, which provided the basis for its iron and steel industries. The symbolic discourse of Europeanism has less resonance in the Basque Country than in Catalonia, since there is a weaker historic basis for it. Unlike Catalonia, the Basque Country has not historically been a land of passage between Europe and the rest of Spain and nationalism has a more isolationist bent. The Europe of the Regions discourse in Catalonia is seen as an end in itself but, while the Basques are willing to play this game, they are clear that it is a mere way station towards national self-determination.
Galicia in Europe
Nationalism has long been weaker in Galicia than in the other historic nationalities. Its political culture remains conservative and clientelistic, dependent on connections with the central power in Madrid. Nationalism has historically been fragmented and, while the Bloque Nacionalista Galego is the opposition in the Galician parliament, it is a heterogeneous coalition including radical nationalists, home rulers, social democrats and Gallegos have a rather strong sense of regional identity but most of them think of this as compatible with Spanish identity. 19 They rate slightly below the average in their positive attitudes towards Spaniards and Europeans and feel slightly less Spanish and slightly more European than the average. 20 This presents a much less dramatic picture than either Catalonia, with its turning to Europe and multiple identity, or the Basque Country, with its continued particularism.
The European dimension in Gallego identity does appear to be getting stronger. It is likely that in the longer term Europe will serve to undermine the dependent political system and clientelistic practices of Galicia, widely blamed for its economic backwardness. Regional policy has been largely Europeanized and Brussels is bringing pressure to bear to spend less on infrastructure projects, which can be used for political patronage, and more of business development, innovation and human capital. The old political system is rooted in the small towns and rural areas, a declining part of the region, and is weaker in the cities and the coastal areas, which are reaching out to Europe.
The new Euro-Region, linking Galicia to the north of Portugal, provides economic linkages and resources independent of the central state and encourages more independent forms of development. What is still lacking, however, is a moderate nationalist or regionalist coalition able to take advantage of these trends and create a vision for Galicia in Europe comparable to that promoted in Catalonia.
Nations beyond the state?
European integration has transformed the old nationalities question in Spain. The tension between the españolista insistence on the unity and uniformity of the state was always incompatible with the national realities of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. The apparent common strategy also masks differences in long term aspirations and in visions of Europe. While the Catalan CiU would no doubt be content with the Barcelona programme, with its recognition of the Spanish dimension, albeit in a new plurinational state, the PNV still hankers after full independence and participation in Europe as a state, while the BNG is divided on the issue as on other issues. It may be that the Barcelona process will lead to a new synthesis, with the Basques moderating their separatism and the BNG moving politically to the centre but this process has only begun.
There is as yet no clear institutional framework for stateless nations within Europe, for all the efforts of the Basques, Catalans and Flemish to establish one. Symbolic opportunities for national projection are legion and these may play an important role both in consolidating nation-building and in satisfying the demands it raises. Some funds are available in Europe, and there are some opportunities to influence policy, but all this is ad hoc and piecemeal. Efforts to institutionalize a 'third level' of European politics, which looked promising at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, have not been followed through in by the nationalities. Once again, we are reminded that the 'nation-state' is merely one form of political order, constantly in transition. Nations, whose connection with the state is more contingent than necessary, are also in flux, being invented and reinvented in different epochs. If Europe does evolve into a more fluid political order resembling, at least in some respects, the pre-state order of multiple and complex authority, it will be those who cling most stubbornly to the nineteenth-century form of the sovereign nationstate in places such as France, Spain and England (sic) who will find the greatest
